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The literature on democracy and corruption is inconclusive on the effect of democracy on
corruption. We intend to supplement this void by arguing that interaction between democracy
and unemployment may exist in shaping the de facto corruption levels. This paper examines
whether such conjuncture exists. We estimate a linear dynamic panel-data model using data
from 80 developing countries over the period 1990–2018. We find that democracy reduces
corruption. However, the potential beneficial effect of democracy on corruption is eroded
by a higher unemployment rate. The results are robust and quantitatively similar across
different empirical specifications. These results imply that developing countries should focus
on decreasing the unemployment level so as to take advantage of democratization in their
fight against corruption.
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Problem of corruption1 is particularly acute in developing countries. Why is that so? As it
seems, corruption is the greatest hurdle to economic and social development. International
development agencies, such as the World Bank, have actively encouraged developing coun-
tries to pursue policies that will reduce corruption. However, many of those countries that
want to deal with corruption also have weak democracies or nondemocratic governments.
It is therefore important to understand the effect of democracy on corruption. For exam-
ple, if democracy encourages corruption, then countries face a trade-off between increased
democracy and reducing corruption.
This paper answers two questions: i) Does democracy reduce corruption? and ii) Does
unemployment alter the relationship between democracy and corruption ? Answers to these
questions cannot be discerned from theory because the theoretical impact of democracy on
corruption is unclear. On the one hand, democratic institutions may have a negative effect
on corruption, because democracy encourages controls (i.e political competition), empowers
voters (i.e political rights) and increases the probability that corrupt behaviors will be ex-
posed and punished (i.e transparency); this in turn fasters the development of management
and law enforcement strategies within which corruption will become apparent, reduces the
discretion exercised by officials, undercuts favorable treatment for special interests and affects
the normative perceptions of corruption in a society, making corrupt activities less appeal-
ing (Manzetti, 2000; Montinola and Jackman, 2002; Bohara et al, 2004; Carothers, 2007;
Carbone and Memoli, 2013). On the other hand, democratic institutions may encourage
corrupt and dishonest practices. One reason is that election campaigns require funding, and
more competitive elections may make political parties and candidates vulnerable to pressure
from contributors (Rose-Ackerman, 1999). As a consequence, elected government may de-
fend the private interests of funders rather than general interests. In addition, it is easier
for democratic government to reinforce existing patron-client relationships, leading to the
1Corruption is defined as the abuse of public power for personal gains. While corruption exists also in
the private sector, particularly when decision-makers’ interests are at odds with those of shareholders, for the
purpose of the present study, we assume only bribes received by government officials.
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democratization of corruption rather than its reduction (Grassi and Memoli, 2017). Thus,
the overall effect of democracy on corruption has to be determined empirically.
Unemployment may affect the democracy-corruption relationship. We provide two plau-
sible explanations. First, note that job opportunities in developing countries are mainly
created by the public sector2 . In the presence of high level of unemployment, government
officials, for a single job opening, may receive several entries. This creates competition for
the candidates, and this in turn reinforces recruiters’ roles (officials). In this context, both,
job seekers and officials’ agents might have stronger incentives to adopt corrupt practices.
More precisely, as suggested by Bouzid (2016), job seekers’ who consider that they cannot
be selected in fair competition will be more likely to positively react to the signal from the
corrupt official for a bribe. The government officials will use their power to grant the job
to the applicant willing to pay the highest bribe (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Tanzi, 1998;
Azfar et al., 2001; Bouzid, 2016). Such behaviors are supposed to occur more frequently
in presence of a democratic government for two reasons. First, a high unemployment rate
may lead to inequality, democratic societies, might not to be able to implement strict and
transparent laws that would denounce fraudulent practices of government officials. This view
is found in Kotschy and Sunde (2017) work who observe that where the inequality is too high,
democracies appear not to be able to implement good institutional environments. Second, to
the extent that democracies are typically associated with a frequent change of government
officials, corruption may particularly increase in the presence of high unemployment rate, as
officials would primarily care about the revenue it can generate before to get out.
The second explanation is related to the fact that high unemployment rate at the coun-
2Two important developments explain why the public sector has a monopolistic power to absorb the
domestic workforce in developing countries. One is related to the fact that governments have used public-
sector employment as a tool for generating and redistributing rents in developing countries. For example, in a
widely cited paper, Gelb et al. (1991, p. 1186) state: “Consistent with theories of rent seeking behavior, public
sector surplus labor is viewed in this paper as the consequence of lobbying for more high wage (and high-rent)
employment.” The second development out puts the safety of government jobs as a partial insurance against
the undiversifiable external risk faced by the domestic economy. According to Rodrik, (2000, p. 231): “by
providing a larger number of “secure” jobs in the public sector, a government can counteract the income and
consumption risk faced by the households in the economy. While only those employed in the public sector are
direct beneficiaries of such insurance, the benefits can be spread throughout the economy through informal
risk-sharing arrangements within extended families”.
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try level may have a negative impact on individual’s satisfaction towards the efficiency and
the impartiality of government and the public administration (Laurence, 2015). As the in-
efficiency grows, individuals lose trust in the government; they are more likely to refuse all
cooperative behavior, preferring instead instrumental and individualistic approaches to prob-
lems and opportunities (Grassi and Memoli, 2017). Following this idea, it is argued that low
levels of satisfaction with government nurture corruption insofar as it transforms citizens into
clients and bribers who look for private protection to gain access to decision-makers (Della
Porta, 2000; Guerrero and del Castillo, 2003; Morris and Klesner, 2010). To the extent that
survival in power of government requires the support of voters, democratic regimes are less
prone to deal with corruption, because in presence of undesirable economic conditions (i.e.
high unemployment rate), citizens are more likely to reveal their distaste towards the effec-
tiveness of laws (Altindag and Mocan, 2010); this may induce even those who had initially
refused to become a part of the corrupt machine to join for lack of viable alternatives.
The importance of unemployment in determining the effect of corruption on democracy
can be gleaned from Fig1, which shows the association between democracy and corruption
for 80 developing countries. The countries are grouped according to their unemployment
levels: Group 1 consists of countries where the rate of unemployment averaged over the
period 1990 – 2018, is less than the average value of unemployment over the period 1990-
2018, namely 8,025% and Group 2 consists of countries where the unemployment rate is
more than 8,025%. The corruption variable is derived from The International Country Risk
Guide (ICRG). It ranges from 1 (most corrupt) to 6 (least corrupt). This is an assessment of
corruption within the political system. The democracy variable is downloaded from Polity IV.
It is conceived as three essential, interdependent elements, the presence of institutions, the
existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of executive power and the guarantee
of civil liberties. The Democracy indicator ranges from 0 (Least democratic) to 10 (most
democratic). For, the countries in Group 1, corruption seems to be positively associated with
democracy (Fig1.a). The same result is obtained in Group 2. However, it is worth noting
that when the unemployment rate is high (in Group 2) the beneficial effect of democracy on
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Figure 1: Corruption and Democracy.
Fig1.a. lower unemployment rate countries (Group 1). Fig1.b. higher unemployment rate countries (Group 2). The
data on corruption and democracy are averaged from 1990 to 2018. The democracy variable ranges from 0 to 10, a
higher number implies more democratic rights. The corruption variable ranges from 1(most corrupt) to 6(least corrupt).
A lower unemployment rate country (i.e. Group 1) consists of countries where the unemployment rate is less than the
average value of unemployment over the period 1990-2018, namely 8,025% and higher unemployment rate countries (i.e.
Group2) consists of countries where unemployment rate >8,025%. There are 33 countries in Group 1 and 47 countries
in Group 2.
corruption seems to be eroded. This is illustrated by the rate curve slope which becomes
smaller. Thus the data suggest that there might be an interaction between democracy and
unemployment in determining corruption level.
Few studies provide evidence that the effect of democracy on corruption is conditional on
economic and social factors. Neudorfer (2015), using a large-N approach (up to 139 countries,
1984–2006), finds robust empirical support that democratic rights are more likely to limit cor-
ruption levels in rich countries with educated and informed voters who demand public goods
from the government than in poor countries with less-informed voters who demand little
spending on public goods. Thus, economic development and democracy indeed conditionally
affect corruption. Dong and Torgler (2011), with a theoretical and empirical investigation,
document that the effect of democracy on corruption is conditional on income distribution
and property rights protection. In particular they indicate that democracy will work better
as control of corruption if the property right system works and there is a low level of income
inequality. On the other hand if property rights are not secured and there is strong income
inequality, democracy may even lead to an increase in corruption. Rose-Ackerman (1999)
focuses on honesty and trust as they affect the functioning of the democratic state and the
market. In particular the author discusses the mutual interaction between trust and democ-
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racy and how such interaction may affect corruption. She argues that anticorruption agenda
is part of overall efforts to increase democratic legitimacy by enhancing the trustworthiness
of government, improving the transparency, wide spreading compliance with the rules and
by increasing the role of citizens beyond simply voting for the parties and candidates of their
choice. Kotschy and Sunde (2017) investigate the role of economic equality in moderating the
effect of democracy on institutional quality. In particular, they test whether the quality of
economic institutions is affected by an interaction between political institutions and equality.
Based on a panel of 96 countries over the period 1970-2010, the authors provide evidence
for a non-monotonic effect of democracy on the institutional quality that is moderated by
inequality.
However, empirical studies on the relevance of unemployment in shaping the relationship
between democracy and corruption remain remarkably scarce. To our knowledge, this paper
is the first empirical study that attempts to examine the interaction effect of unemployment
and democracy on corruption across a range of developing countries. We examine the period
1990-2018. We apply the dynamic panel generalised method of moments (GMM) techniques
to correct any potential bias resulting from omitted variables, simultaneity, or unobserved
country-specific effects. This paper employs two available dynamic panel GMM estimators: i)
the ”Difference GMM” estimator developed by Arellano and Bond (1991), and ii) the ”System
GMM” estimator developed by Blundell and Bond (1998) and Arellano and Bover (1995).
Both reference methods produced consistent results. We find that the potential beneficial
effect of democracy on corruption is eroded by higher unemployment. These results are
robust across different empirical specifications. They imply that excessively high levels of
unemployment raise corruption even in democracies, i.e. democracies appear not to be able
to implement good governance quality if unemployment is high.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and
the variables, Section 3 discusses the estimation procedure, Sections 4 shows the empirical
results, and Section 5 concludes.
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2 Data and Variables
Our empirical analyses utilize panel data of 80 developing countries over the period 1990-
2018 (see the Appendix for the list of countries). The descriptive statistics of all variables
are reported in Table 1.
2.1 Corruption
There are many sources that provide ratings on the level of corruption in various countries.
As shown none of the measures of corruption is perfect. For instance, Rohwer (2009) argues
that due to the absence of an international consensus on the meaning of corruption and be-
cause of the many different faces of corruption and its very nature, it is almost impossible to
deliver a precise and objective measure for the phenomenon. Shukhova and Nisnevich(2017)
caution that different measures of corruption may lead to different, and even opposite, con-
clusions. Donchev and Ujhelyi (2014), distinguishing perceptions from experience, observe
that corruption measures may be more problematic than suggested by the existing litera-
ture. Therefore in order to increase the credibility of our results, we employ three different
measures of corruption from three different sources for our benchmark regressions.
The first measure of corruption, icrg, is derived from the data on political rights published
by International Country Risk Guide. The ICRG corruption index captures the degree of
corruption within the political system (e.g., demand of special payments, bribes connected
with import and export licenses, exchange controls, tax assessment, police protection, or
loans) prevailing in countries on the basis of the experts assessment. The data ranges from
0 (most corrupt) to 6 (least corrupt). The second measure, control corruption, is derived
from the control corruption index published by the World Government Indicators (WGI).
WGI consists of 6 indicators measuring the quality of government, one of which is Control of
Corruption Index. This corruption index captures ”perceptions of the extent to which public
power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as
well as “capture” of the state by elites and private interests. The index ranges from 0 to
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100, where a higher rating implies higher levels of control corruption. The third measure,
v-dem corruption index is derived from the political corruption index published in the QOG
Standard Dataset 2020, and it includes measures of six distinct types of corruption that
cover both different areas and levels of the polity realm, distinguishing between executive,
legislative and judicial corruption. The index ranges from least corrupt to most corrupt.
To ease comparison between the different measures of corruption, we follow Acemoglu
et al.(2008) and normalize icrg, vdem and control to lie between zero and one, such that a
higher number implies less corruption for icrg and control and more corruption for vdem.
The regressions that employ icrg and vdem as measures of corruption cover 80 countries and
have up to 2320 observations while the control regressions have 1840 observations, as the
control corruption index starts from 1996. This clearly generates a potential sample selection
problem.
2.2 Democracy
Like corruption, democracy also suffers from the problem of measurement. Coppedge (2002)
argues that the measurement of democracy is disputed due to the problems of conceptual-
ization, measurement and aggregation and no single index offers a satisfactory response to
these problems, and even the best indices have significant weaknesses. For the purpose of
this study, the PolityIV democracy index is used as a measure of democracy. This index
reflects the openness and the competitiveness of the political process as well as the presence
of institutions that foster political participation. The index ranges from zero to ten, where a
higher rating implies higher levels of democracy.
2.3 Unemployment rate
We employ as a measure of unemployment, Unemployment rate, derived from the Inter-
national Labour Organization, ILOSTAT database, published by the World Development
Indicators (WDI). This index refers to the number of unemployed persons as a percentage
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of the labor force (the total number of people employed plus unemployed), modeled ILO
estimate.
We hypothesize a positive association between the unemployment rate and corruption
level for the following three reasons. The first reason is that unemployment is likely to
raise income inequality leading to increased poor disproportionately. To the extent that the
poor are more often subject to corrupt practices in the course of their routine interactions
with public institutions (Transparency International, 2009), an increase in the poverty level
in the economy might increase the level of corruption. The second reason is based on the
idea that sustained unemployment leads to an economic instability and an increase in illegal
activities (often in the forms of black market), which then makes it easier and cheaper for
corruption practices (Lim, 2018). Finally, unemployment, in developing countries is linked to
the absence of pragmatic labor market policies that could have re-energized the weak labor
market situation in the country. Note that the effective labor market reforms are necessary
to facilitate human capital development to improve social cohesion. Thus the incentive for
corruption to preview may be eroded.
2.4 Others Variables
2.4.1 Control variables
In order to control for countries’ economic characteristics, our analysis includes variables
based on previous studies, we include the following control variables:
1 The economic development of a country, measured by the GDP growth rate. A richer
country will be able to devote more resources to the detection and prevention of cor-
ruption (Paldam, 2001; Serra, 2006; Pellegrini and Gerlagh, 2008; Melgar et al., 2010).
2 The level of a country’s integration into the international economy, measured by the
Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP). The empirical evidence suggests that
corruption is lower in countries where the intensity of international trade is stronger
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(Ades and Di Tella, 1999, Leite and Weidmann, 1999). However, the literature is
very ambiguous on this issue. Hodge et al., (2010) show that the greater this ratio,
the higher the potential of corruption as restriction on trade such as quota, tariff and
license provides mean for rent-seeking.
3 The level of macroeconomic uncertainty, measured by the inflation rate. According to
Bouzid (2016) inflation rate signals real wage deterioration which is positively correlated
with the development of rent seeking behaviors.
4 The quality and the level of education, as measured by the government expenditure on
education % of GDP, is likely to be able to control corruption. Melgar et al. (2010)
found that people who have completed at least secondary education are more likely to
perceive the level of corruption than people with a primary education level.
5 The population size, as indicated by the log of total population. Several authors (Fis-
man and Gatti, 2002; Treisman, 2000) have found evidence that corruption is less
severe in small countries than it is in large countries. Knack and Azfar (2003), how-
ever, argue that this relationship between country size and corruption is an artifact of
sample selection, suggesting that the significance of a country’s population size remains
controversial.
6 The Ethnic fragmentation is a significant predictor of corruption. Evidence suggests
that countries with strong ethno-linguistic fragmentation tend to be more corrupt
(Mauro, 1995; Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Pellegrini and Gerlagh, 2008). This effect
is however not confirmed in Brunetti and Weder (2003).
7 The institutional quality influences the corruption levels. Most studies argue that bet-
ter institutions imply lower levels of corruption (Sandholtz and Koetzle, 2000). We
consider two measures of institutional quality: (i) bureaucratic quality, which reflects
that the recruitment and education of bureaucrats take place within the framework of
an established mechanism irrespective of political power and (ii) law and order, which
indicates citizens’ commitment to laws and the rule of law.
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8 The political instability is an important determinant of corruption. Authors claim that
political instability accounts for the high level of corruption found in many countries
(Billger and Goel, 2009; Campbell and Saha, 2013; Zhang et al., 2009) and that political
stability tends to moderate the adverse effects of corruption in an economy (Habib and
Zurawicki, 2002). We captured political instability by using: internal conflict index
and external conflict index.
Table 1: Summary statistics.
Eastern Europe Latin America MENA Sub-Saharan Asia, Pacific
Africa and Caribbean
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
icrg 0,568 0,194 0,518 0,186 0,480 0,168 0,463 0,182 0,503 0,180
vdem 0,465 0,277 0,621 0,273 0,713 0,182 0,692 0,226 0,529 0,265
control 0,544 0,222 0,422 0,234 0,390 0,165 0,312 0,205 0,422 0,222
Democacy 0,784 0,254 0,768 0,192 0,292 0,263 0,436 0,255 0,607 0,286
Unempl rate 10,109 4,612 5,878 2,912 10,525 4,887 7,206 6,111 5,125 2,886
GDP growth rate 5,325 4,608 4,249 2,501 4,884 4,230 5,098 3,573 5,156 2,863
FDI% GDP 4,710 5,692 3,296 2,557 2,765 3,311 3,705 7,474 4,964 6,499
Inflation (%) 56,497 305,782 67,287 499,658 12,235 16,726 25,825 203,770 14,175 35,575
EducatExp%GDP 4,323 1,133 3,717 1,505 4,213 1,633 3,993 2,669 3,376 1,709
Population 15,714 1,051 16,448 1,158 16,932 1,028 16,257 1,222 16,596 2,342
Ethnic 0,334 0,156 0,409 0,175 0,367 0,207 0,739 0,124 0,407 0,198
Bureaucracy 0,555 0,219 0,463 0,179 0,479 0,103 0,354 0,212 0,583 0,205
Law and Order 0,679 0,153 0,462 0,168 0,660 0,165 0,499 0,171 0,521 0,192
Internal conflict 0,859 0,096 0,733 0,144 0,684 0,176 0,686 0,160 0,724 0,185
External conflict 0,862 0,104 0,852 0,098 0,755 0,147 0,799 0,144 0,862 0,113
The corruption variables icrg, vdem and control are from International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), QOG Standard Dataset 2020 and
WGI, respectively. The data are normalized to lie between zero and one, such that a higher number implies less corruption for icrg and
control and more corruption for vdem. Democracy is the democracy index published in Polity IV. Similar to the corruption measure, the
data are normalized to lie between zero and one such that a higher number implies more democracy. Unemployment, total (% of total
labor force) is the share of the labor force that is without work but available for and seeking employment, GDP growth rate is the annual
percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency, FDI%GDP is the net inflows of investment to GDP,
inflation is the ratio of the GDP in current local currency to GDP in constant local currency, EducatExp%GDP is the ratio of government
expenditure for all levels of education to GDP, population is the total population. The data are from The World Development Indicators
(2020), published by the World Bank. Ethic is the Ethnic Fractionalization in the year 2000 downloaded from the QOG standars dataset
2020. The data on institutions, bureaucratic quality and law and order are from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), law and
order measures the effectiveness of the rule of law, bureaucracy refers to the institutional strength and quality of the bureaucracy. The
data on political instability, internal conflict (such as political violence within the country) and external conflict (such as cross-border
conflicts) are also from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). Similar to the corruption measures, the data are normalized to lie
between zero and one, such that a higher number implies stronger bureaucracy, better law enforcement and higher political instability.
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3 Estimation Model and Methodology
3.1 Model Specifications
We consider two model specifications: In the first one, we regress corruption, as a function of
democracy, unemployment and a set of the macroeconomic control variables. In the second
one, we add to the first specification, an interaction term, that captures the interaction effect
of democracy and unemployment on corruption.
The first model specification of the corruption equation follows:
corri,t = αdemi,t + δunei,t + σcori,t−1 + νZi,t + θi + ǫi,t (1)
Where i refers to countries, t to time, ǫi,t is the country-specific effect, corri,t−1 represents
the perceived corruption at time t − 1 for country i which allows to model the corruption
as a dynamic process and thus captures its persistent effect, demi,t captures the level of
democratization, unei,t measures the unemployment rate, Zi,t is the set of control variables.
Looking if unemployment undermines the democracy - corruption nexus, we extend the
model, by demi,t ∗ unei,t that represents the interaction term. The specification for the
corruption equation becomes:
corri,t = αdemi,t + βdemi,t ∗ unei,t + δunei,t + σcori,t−1 + νZi,t + θi + ǫi,t (2)
3.2 Econometric strategy
To obtain consistent and unbiased results, we estimate the equation (1, 2) using a linear
dynamic panel-data (DPD) model. DPD models contain unobserved panel-level effects that
are correlated with the dependent variable, and this renders standard estimators inconsistent.
The GMM estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) provides consistent estimates
for such models. This estimator often referred to as the ”difference” GMM estimator takes
the first difference of the data and then uses lagged values of the endogenous variables as
instruments. However, lagged levels are poor instruments for first differences. Blundell and
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Bond (1998) proposed a more efficient estimator, the ”system” GMM estimator. The merit
of this method is that it mitigates the poor instruments problem by using additional moment
conditions. However, it utilizes too many instruments. Thus, the difference estimator suffers
from the “weak” instruments problem and the system estimator exhibits the “too many”
instruments problem. Thus, in order to increase the credibility of our results, we report the
estimations for both the difference and system estimators.
Note that, the two estimation procedures assume that there is no autocorrelation in
the idiosyncratic errors. Hence, for each regression, we test for autocorrelation and the
validity of the instruments. Specifically, we report the p-values for the test for second order
autocorrelation as well as the Hansen J test for overidentifying restrictions. These tests,
however, lose power when the number of instruments, i, is large relative to the cross section
sample size (in our case, the number of countries).
Taking all of this into consideration, our estimation strategy is as follows: First, we use
the two-step GMM estimator, which is asymptotically efficient and robust to all kinds of
heteroskedasticity. Second, the independent variables are treated as strictly exogenous in all
the regressions. Third, our regressions utilize only internal instruments — we do not include
additional (external) instruments. Specifically, both the difference and system estimators use
the first difference of all the exogenous variables as standard instruments, and the lags of
the endogenous variables to generate the GMM-type instruments described in Arellano and
Bond (1991).
4 Results
We start by looking at the effects of democracy on corruption without the interaction term,
dem(i, t) ∗ unempl(i, t). Table 2 reports the estimates of Eq (1). The parameter of interest
is the coefficient of democracy, α̂ .
We note that α̂ is positive and significant at the 1% level, suggesting that all else equal,
democracy reduces corruption in developing countries. This result implies that higher democ-
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racy results in lower corruption. This is consistent with a number of prior studies (Manzetti,
2000; Montinola and Jackman, 2002; Bohara et al, 2004; Carothers, 2007; Carbone and Mem-
oli, 2013) that find that democratic institutions may have a negative effect on corruption.
According to the authors, democracy encourages controls (i.e political competition), empow-
ers voters (i.e political rights) and increases the probability that corrupt behaviors will be
exposed and punished (i.e transparency).
We use an example to illustrate the beneficial effect of democracy on corruption. Consider
two countries in the same sub-region in Sub Saharan Africa (SSA) that have extremely
different levels of democratization — Cameroon, Togo and Uganda, the least democratic
country and South Africa, the country with the highest democracy score. Then the regressions
that employ the measure of corruption, icrg, show that an improvement in democracy from
the level of Togo (dem=0,1) to the level of South Africa (dem=0.88) will decrease corruption
by about, [∂corri
∂dem
= 0.0874 ∗ (0.88 − 0.1) = 0.068], 6.80 percent points for the difference
regression and about, [∂corri
∂dem
= 0.0699 ∗ (0.88 − 0.1) = 0.054], 5.40 percent points for the
system regression . The decrease in corr is economically important because the average
annual decrease in corr in Togo, over the period 1990-2020 was about 0.38 percent points.
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Table 2: The direct effect of democracy on corruption
Difference GMM System GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
icrg vdem control icrg vdem control
Democracy,α̂ 0,0874*** -0,0167*** 0,0375*** 0,0699*** -0,0546*** 0,0273***
(0,0384) (0,0115) (0,0133) (0,0411) (0,0201) (0,0093)
Unemployment rate, σ̂ -0,0146*** 0,0014* -0,0015* -0,0132*** -0,0038*** 0,0011***
(0,0020) (0,0010) (0,0009) (0,0023) (0,0014) (0,0004)
Lagged 0,7831*** 0,1763*** 0,5830*** 0,8622*** 1,0395*** 0,8456***
(0,0344) (0,0191) (0,1468) (0,0285) (0,0376) (0,0409)
GDP growth rate 0,0002 -0,0002 0,0001 0,0004 0,0001 0,0011***
(0,0004) (0,0002) (0,0003) (0,0004) (0,0003) (0,0002)
FDI%GDP -0,0007*** 0,0003 0,0001 -0,0009*** -0,0001 -0,0003***
(0,0004) (0,0003) (0,0003) (0,0003) (0,0002) (0,0001)
Inflation(%) -0,0033*** 0,0012*** -0,0001 0,0016 -0,0002 0,0000
(0,0016) (0,0006) (0,0012) (0,0016) (0,0012) (0,0008)
EducaExp%GDP 0,0064*** -0,0024*** 0,0025*** 0,0028* 0,0005 0,0011***
(0,0022) (0,0015) (0,0010) (0,0018) (0,0009) (0,0006)
Population -0,1464*** 0,0603*** -0,1820*** -0,0470*** 0,0331*** -0,0132***
(0,0400) (0,0230) (0,0562) (0,0262) (0,0101) (0,0120)
Ethnic2000 0,6372*** -0,0412*** -0,6311 -0,0667 -0,1359*** -0,0440***
(0,1172) (0,0069) (0,4697) (0,1068) (0,0476) (0,0241)
Bureaucracy 0,2949*** 0,0015 0,1267*** 0,1452* -0,0728* 0,1095***
(0,0929) (0,0185) (0,0617) (0,0934) (0,0456) (0,0330)
Law and Order 0,1901*** -0,0298*** 0,1386*** 0,2207*** -0,0120 -0,0016
(0,0627) (0,0186) (0,0457) (0,0645) (0,0202) (0,0170)
Internal Conflict -0,0468 0,0740*** -0,0505** -0,1209*** 0,0327*** -0,0144
(0,0510) (0,0192) (0,0313) (0,0510) (0,0186) (0,0115)
External Conflict -0,2373*** 0,0034 0,0252 -0,1677*** 0,0255 -0,0117
(0,0516) (0,0168) (0,0453) (0,0533) (0,0257) (0,0167)
Constant 0,9099*** 0,6409*** 0,1697
(0,4801) (0,1787) (0,1946)
Hansen J testa (p-value) 0,797 0,343 0,527 0,176 0,262 0,978
Serial correlation test (p-value)b (p-value) 0,256 0,606 0,615 0,601 0,881 0,837
Number of observations 2106 2106 1638 2184 2184 1716
Number of countries 80 80 80 80 80 80
Number of instruments 39 40 37 41 41 21
• The corruption variables icrg, vdem and control are from International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), QOG Standard Dataset 2020
and WGI, respectively. The data are normalized to lie between zero and one, such that a higher number implies less corruption
for icrg and control and more corruption for vdem. ***significant at 1%.**significant at 5%.* significant at 10%. a:The null
hypothesis is that the instruments are not correlated with the residuals. b:The null hypothesis is that the errors in the first
difference regression exhibit no second order serial correlation.
We turn our attention to the other variables. We observe that σ̂ is negative and sig-
nificant at the 1% level, implying that high levels of unemployment raise corruption. This
finding is in line with Bouzid (2016), who examining the relationship between corruption and
unemployment, find that the development of corruption practices tend to increase the un-
employment rate among youth and educated job seekers which in turn contribute to sustain
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those unlawful practices by forcing the latter to bribe rent-seeking government officials in
order to secure a job. This result suggests that corruption levels are derived by labor market
distortions. Such a conclusion is interesting for developing countries, where corruption is
pretty prevalent. It is also relevant for policy makers who attempt to deal with corruption.
Furthermore, we find that control variables are expected in signs, such as higher GDP growth
rate, more government expenditure on education (%of GDP), greater Ethic fragmentation
and better institutional quality decrease the level of corruption while greater FDI(% GDP),
higher inflation rate, more population and political instability have an adverse effect on the
corruption level. The estimated coefficient of lagged corruption is positive, suggesting that
current corruption is positively correlated with future corruption.
Now, we examine how the effect of democracy on corruption depends on the level of
unemployment rate. We estimate Eq. (2). We note that ∂corri
∂dem
= α+ β ∗ une, and therefore
the parameters of interest are α̂ and β̂. Table 3 reports the results.
The estimates values suggest that unemployment significantly alters the relationship be-
tween corruption and democracy by reducing the beneficial effect of democracy on corruption.
Indeed, α̂ is positive and significant and the 1% level, and β̂ is negative and significant at the
1% level. This result illustrates that the effect of democracy on corruption is less positive
as the level of unemployment expands. This result is very important for both development
practitioners and policymakers as corruption and unemployment are often two of the most
pressing policy issues facing these economies.
To elucidate our results, we evaluate the marginal effect of democracy and unemployment
on corruption, obtained as follows: ∂corri
∂dem
= α̂ + β̂ ∗ une. More precisely, we assess the
estimated value of ∂corri
∂dem
at reasonable values of unemployment, une. Specifically, for each
country, we calculate the average value of une over the period 1990-2018, which we denote
une and evaluate ∂corri
∂dem
at 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th percentile and the mean of une.
The 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th percentile and the mean of une correspond to the average
value of une for Guinea-Bissau, Burkina Faso, Costa Rica, Lithuania, Albania and Sri Lanka
respectively. The results are reported in Table 4.
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Table 3: The interaction effect of democracy and unemployment on corruption
Difference GMM System GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
icrg vdem control icrg vdem control
Democracy, α̂ 0,0708*** -0,0422** 0,0230*** 0,2246*** -0,1245*** 0,0431***
(0,0208) (0,0243) (0,0100) (0,0740) (0,0559) (0,0144)
Democracy * Unemployment rate, β̂ -0,0058*** 0,0024** -0,0030*** -0,0323*** 0,0090* -0,0032***
(0,0021) (0,0016) (0,0013) (0,0084) (0,0055) (0,0019)
Unemployment rate, σ̂ -0,0028*** 0,0023** -0,0025*** -0,0324*** 0,0089*** -0,0029***
(0,0015) (0,0017) (0,0012) (0,0081) (0,0046) (0,0013)
Lagged 0,7928*** 0,7583*** 0,6550*** 0,9230*** 1,0214*** 0,8253***
(0,0125) (0,0489) (0,0403) (0,0353) (0,0360) (0,0350
GDP growth rate 0,0002 -0,0002 0,0004*** 0,0005 0,0002 0,0011***
(0,0002) (0,0002) (0,0002) (0,0005) (0,0003) (0,0002)
FDI%GDP -0,0012*** 0,0000 0,0001 -0,0009*** 0,0000 -0,0001
(0,0001) (0,0001) (0,0001) (0,0003) (0,0002) (0,0001)
Inflation(%) -0,0064*** 0,0005 -0,0017*** 0,0004 0,0004 -0,0007
(0,0009) (0,0010) (0,0005) (0,0019) (0,0012) (0,0009)
EducaExp%GDP 0,0040*** -0,0010 0,0037*** 0,0032 0,0003 0,0017***
(0,0009) (0,0009) (0,0007) (0,0022) (0,0008) (0,0006)
Populationp -0,0691*** 0,0488*** -0,0032 -0,0307 0,0447*** -0,0262***
(0,0126) (0,0108) (0,0163) (0,0255) (0,0109) (0,0129)
Ethnic2000 -0,4449 0,0024 0,3253*** -0,1090 -0,0757*** -0,0200
(0,3108) (0,0681) (0,0943) (0,0687) (0,0309) (0,0442)
Bureaucracy 0,0240 0,0169 0,1837*** -0,1166 -0,0445 0,0355
(0,0346) (0,0248) (0,0633) (0,0830) (0,0378) (0,0531)
Law and Order 0,1563*** -0,0169 0,1575*** 0,2485*** -0,0139 0,0030
(0,0233) (0,0165) (0,0306) (0,0745) (0,0214) (0,0199)
Internal conflict -0,0176 0,0427*** -0,0223 0,0769 0,0329 0,0036
(0,0204) (0,0155) (0,0147) (0,0596) (0,0197) (0,0104)
External Conflict -0,0231*** 0,0016 -0,0119 -0,1981 -0,0006 0,0068
(0,0126) (0,0198) (0,0244) (0,0635) (0,0281) (0,0216)
0,8043*** 0,8450*** 0,4414***
(0,4787) (0,2170) (0,2419)
Hansen J test (p-value)a 0,934 0,497 0,993 0,920 0,528 0,818
Serial correlation test (p-value)b (p-value) 0,135 0,220 0,808 0,604 0,962 0,976
Number of observations 2106 2106 1638 2184 2184 1716
Number of countries 80 80 80 80 80 80
Number of instruments 39 40 24 42 42 21
• The corruption variables icrg, vdem and control are from International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), QOG Standard Dataset
2020 and WGI, respectively. The data are normalized to lie between zero and one, such that a higher number implies less
corruption for icrg and control and more corruption for vdem. ***significant at 1%.**significant at 5%.* significant at 10%.
a:The null hypothesis is that the instruments are not correlated with the residuals. b:The null hypothesis is that the errors in
the first difference regression exhibit no second order serial correlation.
Note that ∂corri
∂dem
drops as une increases from the 10th to the 50th percentile of une. For
the difference GMM estimations, the decline in ∂corri
∂dem
is about 41% for the regression using
icrg and 26% for vdem and for the system estimations, ∂corri
∂dem
decreases by about 92%, 36%
and 32% for icrg, vdem and control respectively. This indicates that the unemployment rate
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reduces the effectiveness of democracy in promoting corruption.
Also, it is worth noting that when taking the icrg regressions, the estimated value of ∂corri
∂dem
,
is positive and significant up to the 50th percentile of une, suggesting that democracy has
a positive effect on corruption for at least half of the countries in the sample. However, the
estimated value of ∂corri
∂dem
loses significance or turns negative and significant when evaluated
at the third quarter of une, an indication that for at least 25% of the countries in our sample,
democracy has no significant effect on corruption or has a negative effect.
Table 4: ∂corri
∂dem
= α̂+ β̂ ∗ une, evaluated at various values of une.
Value of une Percentile of une Corresponding Diffence GMM System GMM
Country icrg vdem control icrg vdem control
2.651 10th Guinea 0,0554*** -0,0359* 0,0151*** 0,1388*** -0,1006*** 0,0509***
(0.0173) (0,0210) (0,0124) (0,0553) (0,0425) (0,0172)
3.825 25th Burkina 0,0487*** -0,0332* 0,0116 0,1008*** -0,0901*** 0,0544***
(0,0159) (0,0196 ) (0,0136) (0,0480) (0,0370) (0,0185)
6.602 50th Costa Rica 0,0327*** -0,0266* 0,0034 0,0110*** -0,0651*** 0,0625***
(0,0141) (0,0168) (0,0167) (0,0166) (0,0257) (0,0218)
10.661 75th Lithuania 0,0094 -0,0170 -0,0085 -0,1202*** -0,0286 0,0345***
(0,0158) (0,0145) (0,0217) (0,043) (0,0220) (0,0267)
15.785 90th Albania -0,0200 -0,0049 -0,0237 -0,2859*** 0,0174 0,0296***
(0,023) (0,0154) (0,0282) (0,0769) (0,0412) (0,0331)
8.025 Mean Srilanka 0,0241* -0,0236*** 0,0429*** -0,0373 -0,0522** 0,0272***
(0,0142) (0,0218) (0,009) (0,0356) (0,029) (0,0023)
• Notes: une is the share of the labor force that is without work but available for and seeking employment(%), and une is the average of
une, from 1990 to 2018. ***significant at 1%.**significant at 5%.* significant at 10%.
5 Robustness check
Next to these estimations, we perform a number of robustness checks. The robustness esti-
mations employ the measure of corruption that has been widely used in the literature, i.e.,
icrg3. Furthermore, to keep the discussion focused and also conserve on space, we report a
summary of the results in Table 5. The full estimation results are available in the supple-
mentary file, available from the authors upon request. Below, we provide a brief discussion
3See Swaleheen (2011), Dal BÓ and Rossi (2007) and Knack and Keefer (1995) for details.
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of the robustness estimations.
First, it is commonly argued that the marginal value of money in poor economies is
greater as compared to rich economies. As such, wealthier countries are likely to undergo
less corruption (Gundlach and Paldam, 2000; Lučić et al., 2016). According to Treisman
(2000) in rich countries, corruption decreases with the improved living standards, on the
one hand, and with many institutional, sociological, and demographic changes which usually
accompany the improvement in national income, on the other hand. Hence, we could suspect
that the determinants of corruption to poor countries are different from the determinants of
corruption to more developed economies. We, therefore, run separate regressions for high
income, upper-middle-income, lower-middle-income and low-income countries. In Panel A of
Table 5, we report the values of α̂, β̂ and σ̂. Clearly, the results are robust: and are significant
at the 1% level in 6 out of the 8 regressions.
Second, we assess the extent to which the coefficients change if we remove transition
countries, we think that this country may be an outlier because of its political transformation.
We refer to Treisman (2007)’s following logic: the stability of political institutions, whether
democratic or not, is a significant corruption deterrent and that greater civil liberties in young
democracies may lead to higher corruption levels because of an ineffective rule of law and
larger scope for private transactions. Panel B in Table 4 shows that our results are robust.
Third, we recognize that our benchmark regressions do not include time fixed effects. One
reason for including time fixed effects is to expunge the effect of business cycles. However,
including time dummies increases the number of instruments employed in the regressions,
and this in turn weakens the reliability of the empirical results. Here, we test whether our
results hold when we include time fixed effects. As shown in Panel C, α̂ and β̂ are significant
at the 1% level in all regressions.
Fourth,, we suspect a potential endogeneity problem associated with democracy and un-
employment. Specifically, it is possible that an unobserved variable may affect both corrup-
tion and unemployment. The difference and the system estimators mitigate the endogeneity
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problem. However, in order to be thorough, we address this issue explicitly by specify-
ing democracy and unemployment as endogenous variables in our regressions. Note that if
democracy is endogenous, then the interaction between democracy and unemployment is also
endogenous. We consider two cases. In case 1, only democracy is endogenous. Thus here,
we re-estimate Eq. (1) where we specify democracy and demcracy*unemployment as endoge-
nous variables. In case 2, both democracy and unemployment are endogenous and therefore
the endogenous variables are democracy, unemployment rate, and unemployment*democracy.
The results hold in both cases: α̂ and β̂ are significant at the 1% level in all regressions.
Table 5: Robustness regressions
Difference GMM System GMM
β̂ α̂ σ̂ β̂ α̂ σ̂
Panel A: Income sub-samples
High income -0,0073*** 0,1410*** -0,0086*** -0,0208*** 0,2008*** -0,0126***
(0,0036) (0,0566) (0,0048) (0,0072) (0,0965) (0,0061)
Upper-middle income -0,0639*** 0,8883*** -0,0318*** -0,0517* 0,7039* -0,0399***
(0,0311) (0,4364) (0,0149) (0,0348) (0,4808) (0,0215)
Lower-middle income 0,0025 0,1134 -0,0156*** -0,3334*** 0,9009*** -0,3170***
(0,0103) (0,0643) (0,0077) (0,1429) (1,1625) (0,1663)
Low income 0,1204 0,8131 -0,0951** -0,5195*** 0,6929*** -0,4192***
(0,0695) (0,5110) (0,0554) (0,2111) (0,3841) (0,1687)
Panel B:
Exclude transition countries -0,0033*** 0,0475*** -0,0042*** -0,0264*** 0,1469* -0,0265***
(0,0017) (0,0194) (0,0014) (0,0096) (0,0912) (0,0081)
Panel C:
Include time fixed effects -0,0038*** 0,0297* -0,0046*** -0,0166*** 0,1623*** -0,0136***
(0,0017) (0,0183) (0,0019) (0,0078) (0,0606) (0,0067)
Panel D: Endogenity problem
Case 1 -0,0032*** 0,0596*** -0,0021*** -0,0024*** 0,0852*** -0,0038**
(0,0010) (0,0210) (0,0010) (0,0012) (0,0282) (0,0012)
Case 2 -0,0078*** 0,1022*** -0,0104*** -0,0061*** 0,0290*** -0,0111***
(0,0038) (0,0533) (0,0030) (0,0012) (0,0146) (0,0012)
• The corruption variables icrg, vdem and control are from International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), QOG Standard Dataset
2020 and WGI, respectively. The data are normalized to lie between zero and one. A higher number implies less corruption.
p-values in parenthesis. ***significant at 1%.**significant at 5%.* significant at 10%.
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6 Conclusion
This paper has examined the interaction between democracy, unemployment and corruption.
Based on a panel of 80 developing countries over the period 1990-2018, dynamic panel esti-
mates deliver evidence that democracy decreases corruption and that the effect of democracy
on corruption depends on the level of unemployment in the country. More precisely, we
show that the potential beneficial effect of democracy on corruption is eroded by a higher
unemployment rate. These results robust across different empirical specifications, suggest
that excessively high levels of unemployment increase corruption even in democracies, up
to the point that democracies appear not to be able to implement good governance qual-
ity if unemployment is too high. We believe that these findings contribute to the literature
and have important policy implications for developing countries, where both corruption and
unemployment are often two of the most pressing policy issues facing them (Bakare, 2011).
There are limitations of our analysis that can serve as avenues for future research. First,
future research should investigate the mechanisms by which unemployment erodes the bene-
ficial effect of democracy on corruption. Second, the analysis should also exploit the hetero-
geneities that exist between countries in our database (for instance, geographical and cultural
differences) and apply Spatial panel data estimation. This estimation technique is commonly
used in the regional science and the spatial econometrics literature and it could be applied in
our context to further explore the role of unemployment on the democracy-corruption nexus.
Finally, it would be worthwhile to include more countries in the analysis as well as to estimate
the model over a much longer time span.
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Appendix
List of countries under the study:
Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Bangladesh, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria,
Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cote D’Ivoire, Croatia, Czech Repub-
lic, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia,
Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia,
Iran, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Latvia, Lebanon, Liberia, Lithuania, Madagas-
car, Malawi, Mali, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nicaragua, Niger,
Nigeria, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Sene-
gal, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Syria, Tan-
zania, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam, Zambia and
Zimbabwe.
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